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In Chapter 5 of Book V of the Nichomachean Ethics, an analysis of justice in exchange leads 
Aristotle to conclude that differing things can only be made commensurate in a practical sense. The 
passage sets up a relationship between association, exchange, equality, and commensurability in market 
exchange and leaves Aristotle with differing notions of commensurability. Aristotle considers demand (a 
need for resources) to be a means of resolving the tension; however, this possibility is subject to 
objections. Aristotle’s analysis of association for exchange is problematic, as is his exchange-equality 
relationship; examples from economic game theory illustrate the objections to Aristotle’s analysis. 
Finally, the dependence of equality on commensurability proves to be problematic due to Aristotle’s 
own distinction between strict and practical commensurability. Therefore, Aristotle’s analysis in the 
passage is subject to two observations. The first is that demand does not provide commensurability. The 
second is that the relationship of association, exchange, equality and commensurability must be 
reconsidered in order to avoid objections. 




Justice in Exchange:  
The Difficulty of Establishing Commensurability in Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics 
Of all of Aristotle’s writings, the Nichomachean Ethics is his most well-known and studied work 
(Bostock, 2000). In Book V of the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle addresses the issue of justice (Bostock, 
2000, p. 54). In chapter 5 of book V, the discussion of general issues of justice are narrowed to the 
discussion of the specific issue of justice in exchange (Bostock, 2000, p. 63). Ethics is a practical 
philosophy, and considerations of justice in exchange will have many practical issues to resolve (Broadie, 
2002, p. 11). Exchange, often taking place in a market context, provides a number of examples for 
Aristotle to navigate the difficult discussion of justice in exchange. Narrowing the scope of justice in 
exchange further, commensurability (the ability to compare two things by common measurement) is a 
tool through which just and unjust exchanges can be distinguished from each other (Apostle, 1975, p. 
XVII). The issue of commensurability in context of exchange proves to be troubling for Aristotle.  
Philosophical commentary on this passage of Aristotle has generally overlooked the problem of 
commensurability that Aristotle himself recognized and attempted to address in Chapter 5. Broadie, 
Rowe, Apostle, and Grant, all provide commentary on the passage, but they do not mention the 
commensurability problem despite translating the very sentence where Aristotle’s himself raises the 
issue (Apostle, 1975, pp. 264-265; Broadie, Rowe, 2002, pp. 342-345; Grant, 1885, pp. 116-122). 
Bostock’s commentary in Aristotle’s Ethics also fails to mention the commensurability problem. Recent 
thinkers, however, have given more attention to the difficulties in the passage (McNeill, 1990, p. 55). 
Economic thinkers have taken a special interest in this passage and for good reason. Marx and 
Schumpeter both critique Aristotle’s analysis. Schumpeter provides a critical but nonetheless lacking 
rebuttal of Aristotle’s analysis and conclusions in the passage (Meikle, 1979, p. 58).  Marx seems to grasp 
the significance of the commensurability problem and offers his own solution in Capital; unsurprisingly, 
it is labor that provides commensurability (Marx, 1887, p. 39). For Jevons, Marshall, and Ricardo, utility 
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was able to provide commensurability (Meikle, 2000, pp. 251, 252, & 259). The commensurability 
problem in chapter 5 has been both ignored and appreciated, and it is in the discussion of this passage 
that the divisive issue of value arises and may clue us in to the reason for such different responses from 
the philosophy and economic departments.  
The discussion of commensurability ultimately requires an idea of value and specifically an idea of 
value that accommodates a feature that provides commensurability for differing objects. A working 
concept of value, however, is difficult to develop, and if a discussion of value is present in this particular 
work of Aristotle, then it is present in the passage most subtly. However, the pressing issue of value is 
not the subject of this thesis; rather this thesis will address whether Aristotle presents a compelling 
account of the relationship of commensurability to other relevant variables and whether true 
commensurability is possible. Understanding the issue of commensurability provides a firmer footing for 
addressing the issue of value in future research. 
The first section of this thesis will examine the text of V.5 and the significant commentary on the 
text in order to introduce the body of philosophic thought on the passage. The second section will 
examine the difficulties in the passage, namely, the status of demand relative to association, exchange, 
equality and ultimately commensurability. The third and final section will review the implications of the 
difficulties identified in the second section. 
I. 
The text of chapter 5 is quite succinct and his comments in this passage are highly regarded (Grant, 
1885, p. 121). This first section will walk through the text of chapter 5 and recount commentary and 
provide analysis on each section of the text. 
I.1 
“Some think that reciprocity is without qualification just, as the Pythagoreans said; for they defined 
justice without qualification as reciprocity. Now reciprocity fits neither distributive nor rectificatory 
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justice – yet people want even the justice of Rhadamanthus to mean this: Should a man suffer what 
he did, right justice would be done - for in many cases reciprocity and rectificatory justice are not in 
accord; e.g. if an official has inflicted a wound, he should not be wounded in return, and if some one 
has wounded an official, he ought not to be wounded only but punished in addition. Further, there 
is a great difference between a voluntary and an involuntary act.” (Aristotle Ethica Nicomachea V.5 
1132b22-31, trans. Ross) 
Reciprocity is neither sufficient for distributive justice nor sufficient for rectificatory justice. 
Reciprocity does not fit distributive justice because distributive justice is concerned with the allocation 
and distribution of goods or (most commonly) punishments. Reciprocity (defined by Aristotle later in the 
paragraph) is good for good, evil for evil – a return of like for like. While distributive justice is concerned 
with just distribution, reciprocity puts no qualification for providing justice; like for like is all that is 
necessary for reciprocity (Lamont, 2017). Aristotle says, “Some think that reciprocity is without 
qualification just, as the Pythagoreans said” (1132b22-23); clearly, like for like (simple reciprocity) will 
not always be in accord with justice nor will it always produce the same notions of justice as a just 
distribution of resources would (Bostock, 2000, p. 63). Similarly, rectificatory justice will not produce the 
same results as reciprocity. Rectificatory justice, which Aristotle contends is primarily concerned with 
restitution, will differ from reciprocal punishment (Lamont, 2017). Aristotle provides two cases to 
demonstrate the inconsistency of reciprocity and rectificatory justice. 
Status imbalance is one instance where reciprocity and rectificatory justice will not be consistent. 
Aristotle says, “Now…if an official has inflicted a wound, he should not be wounded in return, and if 
some one has wounded an official, he ought not to be wounded only but punished in addition." 
(1132b23-30). Reciprocity, as a standard of justice, would dictate that status is unimportant in 
determining what constitutes a just punishment; a wound should be inflicted for a wound – an evil for 
an evil. Rectificatory justice, however, would see status as a contributing variable to determining a just 
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outcome; inflicting a wound for a wound gives the individual with lower status insufficient punishment. 
The individual inflicting a wound on an officer would be punished too little if he was simply punished in 
return (or in a like manner) (Bostock, 2000, p. 63). Rectificatory justice would mandate punishment in 
addition. The imbalance of status shows the inconsistency between the demands of reciprocity and 
rectificatory justice. 
A distinction between voluntary action and involuntary action will also demonstrate the differences 
between reciprocity and rectificatory justice. Reciprocity, as a standard of justice, is unable to 
distinguish between voluntary and involuntary action. For example, if someone is coerced into 
wounding an official (to use Aristotle’s example), his action is involuntary. Reciprocity would dictate that 
the appropriate punishment be the same regardless of whether or not the individual was coerced into 
inflicting the wound (Apostle, 1975, p. 265). Rectificatory justice would both identify the imbalance of 
status in this situation and also identify the influence of coercion; these variables would be necessary to 
properly rectify the situation. Therefore, the punishment for the coerced individual should not be as 
great as the punishment for the uncoerced individual. Reciprocity fails to provide justice in a similar 
manner to rectificatory justice; reciprocity and rectificatory justice are not equivalent.  
I.2 
“But in associations for exchange this sort of justice does hold men together-reciprocity in 
accordance with a proportion and not on the basis of precisely equal return. For it is by 
proportionate requital that the city holds together.” (Arist. EN V.5 1132b31-34, trans. Ross) 
Association for exchange is held together by reciprocity. Aristotle recognizes that it is not the sense 
of justice that holds exchange together, at least not retributive or rectificatory justice; rather, it is the 
opportunity for reciprocity that holds association for exchange together. Aristotle probably has in mind 
some early version of political economy (Grant, 1885, 117). Aristotle presents reciprocity as providing 
the appropriate means of determining justice in exchange and association (Bostock, 2000, p. 63). It is 
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reciprocity that holds exchange together, but (given Aristotle’s previous examples) the statuses and 
voluntary action of the individuals in exchange will be relevant to understanding what justice in 
exchange will actually mean. After all, it is “not on the basis of precisely equal return” that holds 
associations for exchange hold together, rather it is “reciprocity in accordance with proportion” 
(1132b32-33). It is the notion of “proportion” that will help distinguish the just exchange from the unjust 
exchange. Knowing that reciprocity is a possible and even an appropriate response in an exchange 
situation provides agency to anyone seeking exchange. When there is benefit for both parties to 
exchange good for good, grace for grace, and so exchange takes place.  
Exchange, not equal return, between two individuals is the purpose of association for exchange. 
Aristotle establishes that it is through some kind of proportion of differing things and differing outcomes 
that drive associations for exchange (Bostock, 2000, p. 63). Precisely equal return, while undoubtedly 
qualifying as reciprocal, is not what drives exchange. These observations serve to narrow the forces that 
drive exchange; merely equal return is not the purpose of exchange. The purpose of exchange itself 
makes this point clear: individuals do not associate to exchange equal goods with equal returns, but 
rather they associate to exchange differing goods with differing returns. For example, in the 
marketplace, no one offers to exchange two identical goods between two sales booths; differing goods 
are exchanged. Each party in association for exchange is seeking a differing outcome from their original 
standing. Presumably, both parties entering exchange will want to produce good outcomes for 
themselves through exchange. 
I.3 
“Men seek to return either evil for evil-and if they can not do so, think their position mere slavery-or 
good for good-and if they cannot do so there is no exchange, but it is by exchange that they hold 
together. This is why they give a prominent place to the temple of the Graces-to promote the 
requital of services; for this is characteristic of grace-we should serve in return one who has shown 
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grace to us, and should another time take the initiative in showing it.” (Arist. EN V.5 1132b34-
1133a6, trans. Ross) 
People exchange only if they have (or feel they have) the power to reciprocate. On its surface, it 
appears that exchange can only take place between two parties who are willing and able to reciprocate. 
The exchange process must involve the "trading hands" of goods, and this can only be done if both 
parties are capable of doing so. It is the ability to reciprocate that holds exchange together and 
exchange provides the opportunity for reciprocity. The potential for reciprocity can hold people in 
association (Grant, 1885, p. 117). 
Aristotle recognizes that reciprocity, especially of good for good, is beneficial. In fact, it's the 
possibility of a good for good reciprocal association that drives exchange. Individuals engage in exchange 
to make themselves better off. This understanding is what holds the city together because it is not just 
for the exchange of goods that drives people to enter into association or exchange but also ideas, 
information, and other benefits of coordination and proximity provided by residency in a city. Following 
this, receiving “grace” also provides the opportunity for reciprocity. When people are in association with 
each other, the showing of “grace” by someone affords the receiver of the favor an opportunity to 
respond in kind and make both better off. 
I.4 
“Now proportionate return is secured by cross-conjunction. Let A be a builder, B a shoemaker, C a 
house, D a shoe. The builder, then, must get from the shoemaker the latter's work, and must himself 
give him in return his own. If, then, first there is proportionate equality of goods, and then reciprocal 
action takes place, the result we mention will be effected. If not, the bargain is not equal, and does 
not hold; for there is nothing to prevent the work of the one being better than that of the other; 
they must therefore be equated.” (Arist. EN V.5 1133a7-14, trans. Ross) 
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Aristotle establishes proportionate equality of goods as being necessary for exchange to take place. 
By proportionate equality, Aristotle envisions a particular number of goods being equal in value to a 
particular number of other differing goods (Apostle, 1975, p. 266). The builder will supply the house; the 
shoemaker will supply the shoes. Proportionate equality will be established when the proportion of 
houses to shoes is determined. Until there is a mutual understanding of the value of the house relative 
to the shoes, there will be no exchange between the builder and the shoemaker. Assuming that the 
builder and shoemaker wish to exchange, establishing the proportionate equality of goods followed by 
reciprocal action leads to the exchange of their goods.  
An imbalance in the proportion of goods or the lack of reciprocity will not lead to exchange. Aristotle 
says, “there is nothing to prevent the work of the one being better than that of the other” and he 
means, per the example, that one house will not be equal to one shoe. The work of the builder, 
evidenced by the house, is normally worth more than the work of the shoemaker, evidenced by the 
shoe. There must be some acceptable proportion established of houses to shoes. However, even if a fair 
proportion is established, reciprocal action must still take place. If either the builder or the shoemaker 
does not demonstrate reciprocity, by either proposing or accepting fair proportions of their goods, then 
no exchange will take place.  
I.5 
“(And this is true of the other arts also; for they would have been destroyed if what the patient 
suffered had not been just what the agent did, and of the same amount and kind.)” (Arist. EN V.5 
1133a14-16, trans. Ross) 
Principles of reciprocity extend to professions outside of the marketplace. All professions (or arts) 
are subject to the same understandings that guide exchange. For arts to continue and their artists to 
persist, there must be similar proportionate equality established between artists and their art and the 
people who consume art. If there was no reciprocity in the exchange of art (if there was no demand for 
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the art that is created by artists), then art would not persist. Fortunately, many people are willing to 
engage in reciprocal exchange with artists in order to enjoy their art.  
I.6 
“For it is not two doctors that associate for exchange, but a doctor and a farmer, or in general 
people who are different and unequal; but these must be equated. This is why all things that are 
exchanged must be somehow commensurable.” (Arist. EN V.5 1133a16-19, trans. Ross) 
Professions of the same kind will not associate for exchange, according to Aristotle. At first glance, 
Aristotle’s statement appears incorrect; individuals of a profession associate for exchange often. For 
example, any task that requires the coordination of members to produce desirable results will be an 
association of identical individuals for exchange. However, considering exchange in the manner Aristotle 
is considering it, allows him to make this claim intelligibly. There is no incentive for two doctors to 
exchange goods amongst themselves because their goods would be identical and only an equal 
proportion of goods will result in exchange (Apostle, 1975, pp. 265-266). The doctors would need to 
exchange identical goods 1:1; in this situation, no exchange will take place because there is seemingly no 
incentive for exchange. 
There is a tension between professions and goods being different but needing to be made equal. If it 
is differing professions that associate for exchange and there must be equality established in order for 
exchange to take place, then there is a tension that must be resolved. How can a thing be different from 
another thing and still be made equal to it? Aristotle’s task is to resolve this tension. 
Aristotle has a metaphysical difference in mind when discussing professions and their products. The 
essence of the products and the capabilities of two individuals engaged in exchange must be 
comparable in some way; Aristotle is contending that there is more than a surface level equalization of 
goods (perhaps such equalization is provided by money or demand). The issue is whether unlike things 
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can be compared metaphysically (Brodie, 2002, p. 344). Aristotle perceives a metaphysical difficulty 
when comparing differing things. 
Professions of differing and unequal kinds (whose products are also differing and unequal) will 
associate for exchange. This is the more intuitive claim; it is most often the builder and the shoemaker 
who will associate for exchange, not a builder and another builder. Additionally, the differing products 
of the labor of the builder and the shoemaker drive association. The connection of the labor to its the 
product was important for ancient Greece and the connection of products to labor seems to provide an 
additional opportunity for comparison (Grant, 1885, p. 118). It is the inequality of the products that 
entice differing parties to associate for a mutually beneficial exchange.  
The products of professions must be comparable. Proportionate equality fulfills this task; products 
are comparable if and when they are exchanged through proportions. The difficulty, however, is in 
comparing products of differing kinds produced by differing professions. How can two differing things be 
compared? They are comparable in so far as a proportion can be established between them. Why must 
two differing goods be comparable? Aristotle contends that they must be comparable because they are 
exchanged. His argument is as follows:  
1) If two differing goods are exchanged, then they must be comparable. 
2) Two differing goods are exchanged. 
3) Conclusion: the goods must be comparable. 
Aristotle initially comments that "but these [exchanged things] must be equated" and then immediately 
restates it more conservatively, "all things that are exchanged must be somehow commensurable.” 
(1133a18-19). To say that two things are equated or equal (a=b) is seemingly a stronger statement than 
saying that two things are comparable (a≈b). Proportion provides for things to be comparable; equality 




1) If two differing goods are exchanged, then they must be equal. 
2) Two differing goods are exchanged. 
3) Conclusion: the goods must be equal. 
If a distinction between equality and comparability is made, then equality is certainly more difficult to 
establish comparability. Equality between two goods implies a mathematical, abstract relationship. 1 is 
equal to 1; a shoe is equal to a shoe. 1 is equal to 1 in every way; is a shoe, however, equal to any other 
shoe in every way? Whether or not the latter statement is correct, is less relevant to this discussion than 
the appreciation for the difficulty of demonstrating equality. Comparability requires a comparison of 
significant characteristics of two things be established. For example, two shoes can be equal in length, 
but made of different materials; this makes the shoes unequal as shoes but still comparable 
(comparable due to their equal length). 
I.7 
"It is for this end that money has been introduced, and it becomes in a sense an intermediate; for it 
measures all things, and therefore the excess and the defect-how many shoes are equal to a house 
or a given amount of food. The number of shoes exchanged for a house [or for a given amount of 
food] must therefore correspond to the ratio of builder to shoemaker. For if this be not so, there will 
be no exchange and no intercourse. And this proportion will not be effected unless the goods are 
somehow equal." (Arist. EN V.5 1133a19-25, trans. Ross) 
Money is an intermediary because it is able to measure differing things. For any two people seeking 
to exchange, the products of their labor will likely differ. Money allows the degree of variance between 
products to be compared with a money to product ratio rather than a product to product ratio. The 
doctor stores the value of his labor in money and the farmer can do the same. Rather than the doctor 
exchanging his labor product for a proportion of his client’s labor product, the doctor can exchange his 
labor for money; similarly, the farmer can exchange his labor product for money. 
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Without money, the exchange and therefore the equal proportion could still take place. Money is 
convenient because it allows the builder and the shoemaker to exchange without exchanging the actual 
products of their labor; instead they can exchange a representative measurement of their labor product. 
When they exchange a product for money, the underlying proportion of each of their labor product's 
still holds; the underlying proportion (shoemaker to X number of shoes and builder to Y number of 
houses; the appropriate proportion of X to Y) of the labor of each allows the product to money exchange 
to take place. 
I.8 
“All goods must therefore be measured by some one thing, as we said before. Now this unit is in 
truth demand, which holds all things together (for if men did not need one another's goods at all, or 
did not need them equally, there would be either no exchange or not the same exchange); but 
money has become by convention a sort of representative of demand; and this is why it has the 
name 'money' (nomisma)-because it exists not by nature but by law (nomos) and it is in our power 
to change it and make it useless.” (Arist. EN V.5 1133a25-31, trans. Ross) 
All goods must be measured by some one thing because they must be made equal to be exchanged. 
For Aristotle, exchanged things must be equated. It is not enough that they have a simple reciprocal 
nature that allows them to be equated, but they must have something that can measure and compare 
their value to establish equality for two individuals seeking to exchange. Thus far, money and demand 
are the potential tools of measurement (Grant, 1885, p. 119; Apostle, 1975, p. 266).  
Demand drives exchange and is a potential measure of all products. Aristotle says, "if men did not 
need one another's goods…there would be either no exchange or not the same exchange". Demand is 
the true measure of all products. In the previous section, Aristotle described money as being able to 
measure all things, but then in this section, he clarifies this statement: demand is the true measure 
(Broadie, 2002, p. 344). Of course, money is representative of demand. It stores value; its value is 
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remote from the actual products of the producer. For Aristotle, demand is more fundamental than 
money. Demand or need drives the use of money (Apostle, 1975, p. 264). Demand drives exchange and 
its identity is going to be attached to particular products. 
I.9 
“There will, then, be reciprocity when the terms have been equated so that as farmer is to 
shoemaker, the amount of the shoemaker's work is to that of the farmer's work for which it 
exchanges. But we must not bring them into a figure of proportion when they have already 
exchanged (otherwise one extreme will have both excesses), but when they still have their own 
goods. Thus they are equals and associates just because this equality can be effected in their case.” 
(Arist. EN V.5 1133a32-1133b5, trans. Ross) 
The value of a good to be exchanged is established prior to its exchange. The value of a good 
(derived from its combination of inputs relative to other goods) is determined by entering it into the 
market and having a money value attached to it (Grant, 1885, p. 120). After the good leaves the market, 
its value has been determined; the inputs of the farmer and shoemaker's work into their goods have 
been represented by a money value. The relative advantages of the builder over the shoemaker are 
measured prior to the exchange (Grant, 1885, p. 121). Clearly, the advice for determining proportion is 
not meant for the people about to be or presently in exchange, but rather the advice for explaining 
proportion is meant for whoever is examining the exchange after the fact (Brodie, 2002, p. 345). 
Equilibrium shifts after goods are exchanged. The association of two individuals is established when 
there is equality determined between them. The proportionate equality determined by cross-junction of 
the goods of the builder and the goods of the shoemaker allows them to be associated at least for trade. 
Aristotle's thoughts on the cross-junction of goods (found in 1133a7-10) produced by suppliers and 
entered into the market for exchange (1133b1-10) seem to be presciently commenting on equilibrium 
being established between the supplier of a good and the consumer of a good. With the equilibrium in a 
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market being constantly allusive, the effects of an exchange of goods for money will affect both the 
price and the quantity of all similar goods in the market.  
I.10 
“Let A be a farmer, C food, B a shoemaker, D his product equated to C. If it had not been possible for 
reciprocity to be thus effected, there would have been no association of the parties. That demand 
holds things together as a single unit is shown by the fact that when men do not need one another, 
i.e. when neither needs the other or one does not need the other, they do not exchange, as we do 
when some one wants what one has oneself, e.g. when people permit the exportation of corn in 
exchange for wine. This equation therefore must be established.” (Arist. EN V.5 1133b5-11, trans. 
Ross) 
The equality of goods will be established only when there is need. With need driving the use of 
money, need also produces the comparability of goods, at least presumably. The need, either for a 
particular good or for money, is mutual between anyone entering into exchange. Without demand, 
there is no sale of goods and eventually no production of goods. Similarly, when there is no need for a 
particular good (corn) the corn is exported and another good (wine) is imported because there is need 
for it. If the price for corn is zero (because the supplier has the corn; the supplier being the whole city in 
this case), then there will be no supply of corn to the market because no supplier will bring corn to 
market for less than zero.  
Individuals needs must also be equalized. By saying "This equation therefore must be established" 
(1133b10-11), Aristotle is alluding to an equation beyond that of the goods to be exchanged, as this 
equation has already been presented; the equality of need must be determined. The relative need of 
the builder for shoes will be higher than the need of the shoemaker for shoes. Adding complexity to this 
relationship, money introduces the possibility of the builder providing a desired resource (money) to the 
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shoemaker. The differing demand for shoes between the individuals is resolved through the use of a 
common resource that is desirable for both. 
I.11 
“And for the future exchange-that if we do not need a thing now we shall have it if ever we do need 
it-money is as it were our surety; for it must be possible for us to get what we want by bringing the 
money. Now the same thing happens to money itself as to goods-it is not always worth the same; 
yet it tends to be steadier. This is why all goods must have a price set on them; for then there will 
always be exchange, and if so, association.” (Arist. EN V.5 1133b11-15, trans. Ross) 
Money stores demand; demand gives value to money. With money representing demand, future 
exchange will happen with money still driven by the demand. Money, similar to other goods, can either 
appreciate or depreciate. It is the setting of the price, the establishing of equality, that ensures that 
more transactions will take place because the use of money stores value that will be realized at a future 
time: after the transaction takes place.  
I.12 
“Money, then, acting as a measure, makes goods commensurate and equates them; for neither 
would there have been association if there were not exchange, nor exchange if there were not 
equality, nor equality if there were not commensurability. Now in truth it is impossible that things 
differing so much should become commensurate, but with reference to demand they may become 
so sufficiently.” (Arist. EN V.5 1133b15-20, trans. Ross) 
Association, exchange, equality, and commensurability are interdependent concepts. Aristotle 
previously contended that association is necessary for exchange (1133b1-10), that equality is necessary 
for exchange (1133a10-14; 1133a25-30), and that commensurability is necessary for equality (1133a16-
20). Therefore, association, exchange, and equality all rest on commensurability.  
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Money and demand are potential means of commensurability, but Aristotle rejects both. Aristotle 
says “Money, then, acting as a measure, makes goods commensurate” (1133b15-16) and demand 
functioning as the driving force behind money also provides commensurability. However, Aristotle is not 
satisfied with his analysis of commensurability; money and demand are, strictly speaking, unable to 
make things commensurate, “…it is impossible that things differing so much should become 
commensurate” (1133b18-19). The curious structure of these two sentences is worth noting; money is 
said to provide commensurability and then it is rejected; demand is also unable to provide strict 
commensurability.  
“Though therefore it is impossible for things so different to become commensurable in the strict 
sense, our demand furnishes a sufficiently accurate common measure for practical purposes.” (Arist. 
EN V.5 1133b18-20, trans. Rackham) 
Money and demand function as a practical means of commensurability. The Rackham translation 
draws out the practical, working definition of commensurability. To avoid an obvious contradiction in 
this passage, Aristotle must be working with a strict sense and a practical sense of commensurability. 
The practical sense accommodates demand and money while the strict sense finds them lacking as a 
means of providing commensurability. Aristotle seemingly feels that his analysis of demand and money 
has demonstrated that there is good reason to think that demand and money provide commensurability 
(found in 1133a25-30) but not the kind of commensurability required by the standard set in 1133b18-
20. 
Aristotle does not accept money and demand as providing true commensurability for dissimilar 
things. Aristotle says, “Now in truth it is impossible that things differing so much should become 
commensurate” (1133b18-19) so things that are significantly different from each other are 
incommensurate. It may still be possible for things that are somewhat similar to be commensurate; 
however, the lack of similarity is the only reason given for a lack of commensurability. What 
16 
 
distinguishes a pair of similar things from two dissimilar things? There must be some criteria developed 
for providing commensurability. Unfortunately, Aristotle only gives us the relationship of association, 
exchange, and equality to commensurability, and he concludes from these relationships that true 
commensurability is impossible.  
Differing things, being strictly speaking unequal, do not have commensurability in all aspects. 
Adopting a Hume’s attitude towards identity may be the most extreme implication of this conclusion; 
however, a moderate implication is that objects are not equal due to their differences. Out of this 
observation arises the issue of commensurability: do differences between objects exclude the possibility 
of commensurability? Without commensurability between objects, there is not equality; this is a further 
implication established by the connection Aristotle makes in 1133b16-20. 
I.13 
“There must, then, be a unit, and that fixed by agreement (for which reason it is called money); for it 
is this that makes all things commensurate, since all things are measured by money. Let A be a 
house, B ten minae, C a bed. A is half of B, if the house is worth five minae or equal to them; the 
bed, C, is a tenth of B; it is plain, then, how many beds are equal to a house, viz. five. That exchange 
took place thus before there was money is plain; for it makes no difference whether it is five beds 
that exchange for a house, or the money value of five beds.” (Arist. EN V.5 1133b20-28, trans. Ross) 
Aristotle is quick to return to the discussion of money providing commensurability. His rejection of 
money and demand providing strict commensurability is placed in between two separate statements of 
money and demand providing some sort of commensurability. That association, exchange, equality, and 
commensurability are all taking place in the market is clear to Aristotle, but he does not resolve the 
statement “it is impossible for things so different to become commensurable in the strict sense” 




With an understanding of Nichomachean Ethics V.5 established, critical analysis reveals several 
legitimate responses to the passage. The curious statements in 1133b16-20 reveal the most pressing 
objections that could be raised. There are four possibilities for Aristotle’s conclusion about demand and 
strict commensurability: 
A) commensurability can be established through demand, but Aristotle has presented an incomplete 
or flawed analysis of the relationship of association, exchange, equality, and commensurability, 
B) commensurability cannot be established through demand, but Aristotle has presented an 
adequate analysis of the relationship of association, exchange, equality, and commensurability, 
C) commensurability can be established through demand, and Aristotle has presented an adequate 
analysis of the relationship of association, exchange, equality, and commensurability, 
Or D) commensurability cannot be established through demand, and Aristotle has presented an 
incomplete or flawed analysis of the relationship of association, exchange, equality, and 
commensurability. 
Option A) 
There is little translation variance with respect to 1133b18-20. As previously stated, Rackham's 
translation reveals more details than the Ross translation does; Broadie and Rowe translate it as, 
“Strictly speaking, of course, it is impossible that things so different in kind should become 
commensurable, but in relation to people’s needs a sufficient degree of commensurability can be 
achieved.” (2002, p. 167); Irwin translates, “And so, though things so different cannot become 
commensurate in reality, they can become commensurate enough in relation to our needs.” (1985, p. 
131). With consensus on the Greek to English translation established, it is surprising that these 
translators and commentators do not find this statement by Aristotle worthy of comment.  
In 1133b18-20, Aristotle rejects his previous conclusions about demand (1133a25-30 & 1133b1-10). 
Taking Rackham’s translation, “Though therefore it is impossible for things so different to become 
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commensurable in the strict sense,” (1133b18-19), Aristotle spends only half a sentence eroding the 
conclusions established throughout the passage, and he spends the second half of the sentence (again 
taking Rackham’s translation), “our demand furnishes a sufficiently accurate common measure for 
practical purposes” (1133b19-20),  at least attempting to recover some of the progress made in the 
passage. However, sufficient for practical means, hardly carries the same significance as (going back to 
Ross’ translation), “Money…makes goods commensurate” or “demand holds things together” (1133b15-
16 & 1133b6). 
The resolution to commensurability that Aristotle reaches in 1133b18-20 is not satisfying. Having set 
up the equation between association, exchange, equality and commensurability, the first piece of the 
equation, association, and exchange, describes the relations of people; the second piece, exchange and 
equality, describes the relations of people or things; the third piece, equality and commensurability, 
describes the relations of things (McNeill, 1990, pp. 64-65). In each piece, the standard set up in 
1133a16-19 and 1133b1-10 is that it is differing people with differing goods that this equation is 
applicable to; these differences drive a wedge in each piece of the equation. For Aristotle to say that 
these difficulties are resolved “sufficiently accurate…for practical purposes” is not going to be satisfying 
when the issue is whether the goods are metaphysically comparable (Brodie, 2002, p. 344). When 
considering a metaphysical difference, it will be the strict sense of commensurability presented in the 
first part of 1133b18-20 that will be relevant. 
Demand establishes practical commensurability. Demand is a common and necessary theme in 
association, exchange, equality, and commensurability, and Aristotle has demonstrated this throughout 
the passage. It is worth noting that without demand the equation Aristotle has presented is completely 
unnecessary because without demand there is no exchange. 
Aristotle rejects that demand provides commensurability. It is in the strict sense of 
commensurability that Aristotle rejects that demand provides commensurability; the loose sense of 
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commensurability provides for demand being sufficient for commensurability. "Now this unit is in truth 
demand, which holds all things together (for if men did not need one another's goods at all, or did not 
need them equally, there would be either no exchange or not the same exchange)" (1133a26-29). 1133a 
demonstrates the role of demand in dictating how things are exchanged. "That demand holds things 
together as a single unit is shown by the fact that when men do not need one another, i.e. when neither 
needs the other or one does not need the other, they do not exchange" (1133b7-9). 1133b7-9 
demonstrates the role of demand in human relationships. The link of exchange and equality where 
either or both things and people must be made equal, demand will play some role. In the loose sense of 
equality, equality in exchange can be provided for both persons and things through a notion of common 
value. However, considering the strict sense (the metaphysical sense), if demand is to provide equality in 
exchange between people, then (considering Aristotle's previous statements about association for 
exchange) no equality can be established between them because of the differentiated nature of people 
and things. Different and unequal people associate for exchange (1133a16-19). If demand is to provide 
means of establishing equality for things, then we have a clear rejection of this option in reference to 
commensuration “it is impossible that things differing so much should become commensurate, but with 
reference to demand they may become so sufficiently.” (1133b18-20). The impossibility of their 
commensuration arises, in part from their inherent metaphysical inequality. 
If commensurability cannot be established through demand, then the first clause of option A must 
be rejected as well as the first clause of option C. The second piece of each option will be addressed in 
the following section.  
Option B) 
Since demand does not provide commensurability, the equation Aristotle presents “for neither 
would there have been association if there were not exchange, nor exchange if there were not equality, 
nor equality if there were not commensurability.” (1133b16-18) begins to breakdown. Without 
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commensurability, the idea of equality between people or things seems to be impossible, just as 
Aristotle said. Similarly, the numerous mentions of equality being necessary for exchange also seem to 
be setting far too high of a standard for what is possible without equality. 
Aristotle's analysis is incomplete due in part to the connection between association and exchange 
being flawed. Aristotle says, "For it is not two doctors that associate for exchange, but a doctor and a 
farmer, or in general people who are different and unequal" (1133a16-18). Association and exchange 
are key terms to understanding exactly what kind of people Aristotle thinks will associate for exchange. 
Fortunately, Aristotle describes both: 
“in associations for exchange this sort of justice does hold men together-reciprocity in accordance 
with a proportion and not on the basis of precisely equal return... they are equals and associates just 
because this equality can be effected in their case... If it had not been possible for reciprocity to be 
thus effected, there would have been no association of the parties." (1132b31-33, 1133b4-5 & 
1133b6-7) 
Association is held together by reciprocity of proportion, as discussed earlier (1133a31-33). Exchange is 
used in the market sense, as Aristotle says, "The number of shoes exchanged for a house" (1133a22) and 
"the exportation of corn in exchange for wine" (1133b10), basically, the trading of hands of goods. With 
these terms understood, Aristotle's claim that two doctors (generally people engaged in the same kind 
of activity) will not associate for exchange is incorrect. With exchange being understood as a trading of 
goods, the two doctors may not be exchanging the direct products of their activity (medicine, etc.) but 
they will and do exchange goods. Coordinated efforts between doctors, which can easily be described as 
a reciprocal exchange of agreed-upon action is certainly an association of the sort Aristotle describes. 
While the products of the doctors' activities are not exchanged, the way in which they practice their 
activities can be reciprocal (for example, the cartel behavior of some oligopolists in various industries); 
this satisfies the reciprocal nature demanded by two people being in association. Coordinated action 
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should count as exchange. While physical goods (which Aristotle may have assumed to be the only 
things capable of exchange) are easily exchanged, the service industry is engaged in a more obscure 
exchange of goods than is the manufacturing industry. If two doctors choose to charge higher prices for 
their services and the actions of each one are conditional on the actions of the other, then there is some 
exchange taking place; not an exchange of goods but an exchange of actions, and specifically exchange 
of reciprocal action whose conditional nature holds the two together. This seems to satisfy the idea of 
association for exchange; Aristotle has adopted too narrow of a definition of association for exchange to 
accommodate for coordinated and cooperative action. 
Stag Hunt 
The stag hunt game presents a scenario similar to that of the well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma game; 
however, the stag hunt places reciprocal cooperation as the relatively best option for a potential 
defector. The game’s title originates from a story told by Jean-Jacques Rousseau; two hunters can 
choose to coordinate their activity for hunting a desirable animal (stag) or hunt rabbits on their own 
(Henrich, 2004, p. 87). Procuring the stag will require coordination while hunting rabbits does not. So, 
two individuals (two hunters) have the option to coordinate their activity in hunting stags or in hunting 
rabbits; in deciding which animal to hunt, choosing to coordinate will always pay better than choosing to 
defect. This is displayed by table 1: 
Table 1 
Stag Hunt 
 Stag Rabbit 
Stag 2, 2 0, 1.5 
Rabbit 1.5, 0 1,1 
Note. From Foundations of human sociality, J. Henrich, 2004, p. 87. 
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Should player 1 (shown by the rows) choose to hunt stag, player 2 (shown by the columns) has the 
choice between hunting rabbits at a payout of 1.5 or hunting stag with player 1 and earning a payout of 
2. Coordinated activity is beneficial to both players in this scenario.  
This game helpfully illustrates a curious point: individuals who are engaged in the same activity 
(hunters engaged in hunting) benefit from association and coordination of their activities. Aristotle’s 
point in 1133a16-18 that, “it is not two doctors that associate for exchange, but a doctor and a farmer, 
or in general people who are different and unequal” is problematic if we count what happens in this 
game as 'association for exchange'. Clearly, the desire for the best payoff will lead the two hunters to 
coordinate their activities. It does not matter what the goods are, rather it only matters that the payoff 
itself is desirable and that both individuals want to maximize their payoffs. The desire to maximize 
payoffs generally is enough to bring two people whose occupations are the same and equal into 
association with each other. This seems to contradict Aristotle’s conclusion that similar people will 
associate for exchange; however, more investigation is necessary into whether a coordinated activity 
constitutes association for exchange. 
If coordination and cooperation constitute association for exchange, then Aristotle’s analysis has 
failed to account for and has even ruled out a significant factor in market exchange. As previously 
mentioned, oligopolists who engage in cartel behavior can have huge impacts on exchange. They have 
the power to dictate price, production, and status in exchange. While this may be more pronounced in 
modern economic times than in Aristotle’s time, but there is still an opportunity for cartel behavior in 
any market.  
Status 
Another difficulty for Aristotle’s analysis comes when the second piece of the equation is 
considered: exchange and equality. There is some obscurity as to whether the exchange-equality 
relationship is to be established between two persons (equality two people exchanging with each 
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other), or two things (equality between two things being exchanged), (McNeill, 1990, pp. 64-65). 
Aristotle’s proportionality established through cross-junction of builders with houses and shoemakers 
with shoes in 1133a7-10 seems to anticipate the difficulty of the relationship between exchange and 
equality. The exchange of ideas would be a person to person exchange which would not make use of 
things; alternatively, an exchange of things would require the association of persons. The cross-junction 
setup does not lend itself to preferring one reading over the other. That equality in exchange must be 
established between people or things is a challenging equality to establish because inequality between 
persons is quite common as is inequality between things.  
Inequality between people in bargaining may actually produce better outcomes for both individuals. 
The Battle of the Sexes Game illustrates this point (see figure 2). In this game, two players have the 
option of choosing either R or C. Both players choosing R yields a payout of 3 for player 2 (represented 
in the columns) and a payout of 1 for player 1 (represented in the rows); both players choosing C yields a 
payout of 1 for player 2 and a payout of 3 for player 1. Failure to coordinate their choices will result in a 
payout of 0 for both (see figure 2). So, coordination of action will always yield a better payout than will 
defecting.  
Table 2 
Battle of the Sexes 
 R C 
R 3, 1 0, 0 
C 0, 0 1, 3 
Note. From Foundations of human sociality, J. Henrich, 2004, p. 88 
In the majority of instances, each player will choose the option which gives him the highest payout. 
65 percent of the time, each player chooses their best payout option; the mismatch of choices results in 
both players receiving a payout of zero 65 percent of the time (Henrich, 2004, p. 89). If players 
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coordinate their choices, then they both receive non-zero payouts; therefore, an agreed-upon 
preference for one of the players (say player 1) would yield a preferable outcome because it avoids 
inefficient mismatching (or defecting). The Battle of the Sexes game illustrates that choosing a culturally 
expected option may yield a better payout than would choosing the personally maximizing payout 
option; cultural norms can help provide coordination for the players. This means that inequality 
between player 1 and player 2 may be preferable for both players, and the desire for the benefits of 
coordination may lean cultural norms in favor of a particular player. After all, equality in the Battle of 
the Sexes game means a payout of zero for both players; so, equality of payouts, in this game, will likely 
be an undesirable outcome for both players.  
Aside from the inherently interesting implications derived from this game, for Aristotle, the game 
may prove to be problematic for his conclusions. Pure reciprocity is not always in accordance with 
justice (1132b22-31). Can an equal bargain be struck between unequal persons? Is an equal bargain 
even desirable in situations similar to those described in the Battle of the Sexes game? Aristotle says, 
"For it is not two doctors that associate for exchange, but a doctor and a farmer, or in general people 
who are different and unequal; but these must be equated." (1133a16-18). Differences of kind, not just 
of status, are in play here for Aristotle, but status was clearly on his mind given that status imbalance 
between the officer and citizen was one of his two examples of reciprocity not being in accordance with 
justice (specifically rectificatory justice). Aristotle recognizes that status imbalance will be present in 
exchange, but he still concludes that equality must still be established for the unequal persons. Is such 
equality possible? Is such equality desirable? The Battle of the Sexes game suggests that, at least in 
some cases, the answer to the latter question is "no". The second piece of the equation (exchange and 
equality), with respect to people, is also problematic. 
What of the relation of things in the second piece of the equation? Game theory has proven to be a 
useful tool in analyzing the relationships of people in social situations and measuring the likelihood of 
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game player's utility maximizing behavior (Henrich, 2004, p. 57). However, game theory will likely be of 
little help in analyzing the equality relationship of things, especially if those things are not already 
translated by easily measured objects like money or utility. A new strategy must be adopted to analyze 
the unequal relationship of things in exchange. Metaphysical analysis will reveal that equality cannot be 
established between differing things; obviously, a notion of value allows them to be commensurable, 
but a strict metaphysical equality cannot be established between differing things. Meikle explicates this 
rather clearly in his article Quality and Quantity in Economics; he contends that “the heterogeneity of 
things is non-negotiable." (p. 253). Rooted in a classical notion of value, any exchangeable good will 
have certain desirable properties which makes them useful. The relationship between the desirable 
properties and their usefulness provides them with value (Meikle, 2000, pp. 249-250). Heterogeneity is 
introduced on several levels for things. First, the various properties of exchangeable things are different 
and therefore heterogeneous. Second, a thing's usefulness is dependent in part on the needs of its 
owners or potential owners and therefore has numerous potential uses all of which will be 
heterogeneous. Third, the value of all things, being dependent on their properties and usefulness, will 
be heterogeneous. (Meikle, 2004, p. 250)  
Because of the heterogeneity between both people and things and that equality between people 
may not always be desirable, the commensurability and equalization between people and things will be 
difficult if not impossible. That there would not be exchange without equality is now a problematic 
relationship for Aristotle. The equation “for neither would there have been association if there were not 
exchange, nor exchange if there were not equality, nor equality if there were not commensurability.” 
(1133b16-18) now has objectionable qualities in the first two parts (association and exchange; exchange 
and equality). Will the final piece (equality and commensurability) remain intact? 
McNeill identifies the third piece of the equation as being a relation between things (McNeill, 1990, 
p. 65). If value (whether it takes the form of or is described as money, demand, or utility) is a potential 
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means of commensurability, then rejecting the strength of this piece of the equation will be met with 
resistance. The issue of commensurability is an intricate one because on its face there are many 
potentially commensurate objects. Aristotle's examples of the shoemaker and builder provide us with 
many examples. The cobbler's shoe can be compared with many other shoes and many other objects 
other than shoes. Any two shoes are comparable to each other in many respects; no doubt many 
commensurable qualities could be thought up for two shoes. Both shoes are extended objects; both 
shoes can be made of the same material; both shoes can be sold in the market. While both shoes may 
not be, strictly speaking, equal, they certainly seem comparable. However, the fact that both shoes are 
objects, the same shoe size, or sold for the same price hardly seems like the facts that will provide strict 
commensurability between the objects. This difficulty is even more pronounced when considering 
objects that have differing purposes. Comparing a shoe and a house proves to be difficult, but if we do it 
in the same fashion as before, then we can find many commensurate features between the two. Both 
the shoe and the house are extended objects; both the shoe and the house can be made of similar 
materials; both the shoe and the house can be sold in the market. Just because the shoe and the house 
are extended objects, made of similar materials, and sold in the market for the same price does not 
provide strict commensurability between the objects because they are intended for differing purposes. 
It is purpose that differentiates objects and activities in ordinary speech (Meikle, 2000, p. 258). It is in 
the market that someone hopes to find the objects that he does not have in order to satisfy the needs 
he does have. It will be objects that one does not have (as suggested by Aristotle in 1133b5-10) that will 
be sought out in the market. Therefore, option B) is not an acceptable option. With the unresolved 
difficulties in association for exchange, exchange and equality, and equality and commensurability in the 
passage, Aristotle’s equation describing the relationships of association, exchange, equality, and 




The objections in options A) and B) are sufficient to reject options C). The contention in option A) is 
that demand does not provide commensurability; demand for objects does not resolve the metaphysical 
differences between objects. Option B) faces 3 objections, each one addressing a piece of the equation 
established in 1133b16-18 between association, exchange, equality, and commensurability. The first 
objection contends that Aristotle incorrectly identifies the association-exchange relationship as being 
between differing and unequal people when in fact many associations for exchange are between similar 
and equal people as illustrated by the Stag Hunt game. The second objection contends that while 
Aristotle does recognize that differing people often exchange, they must nonetheless be made to be 
equal in reference to exchange whether it is people or things that must be made equal; this may not be 
possible (due to metaphysical differences between people or things) or even desirable as illustrated by 
the Battle of the Sexes game. The third objection addresses the final piece of the equation (equality and 
commensurability) by contending that this relationship is problematic because money, demand, and 
utility (all common means of commensurability) fail to resolve the metaphysical differences between 
objects (objects are still unequal) and these means of commensurability are often only able to provide 
accidental and practical means of commensurability rather than the strict commensurability that 
Aristotle is seeking. These objections necessitate rejecting that demand provides commensurability and 
concluding that Aristotle’s analysis of the relationship of association, exchange, equality, and 
commensurability are problematic. In addition to rejecting options A) and B), these objections make 
option C) the most objectionable since it affirms the opposite of both of these objections. Taking the 
objections seriously necessitates rejecting option C). 
Option D) 
With options A), B), and C) all being unacceptable, option D) remains the only viable response to the 
passage. Commensurability cannot be established by demand and Aristotle’s analysis of the relationship 
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of association, exchange, equality, and commensurability is lacking. Of course, this conclusion presents 
some challenges; what can be salvaged from Aristotle’s EN V.5 passage? 
III. 
Understanding that demand does not provide strict commensurability allows Aristotle to be taken 
seriously when he says, “Now in truth it is impossible that things differing so much should become 
commensurate” (1133b18-19). With this understanding of Aristotle’s analysis, his analysis can be 
corrected to embrace the virtues of the accurate understanding of association and exchange, and their 
relationship to equality and commensurability. Understanding the role of coordination in association 
and exchange will reform their relationship to equality and commensurability. Strict commensurability 
will not permit labor or utility as providing commensurability. The distinction that Aristotle makes by 
identifying strict commensurability as impossible draws out the complexity of the relationships between 
people and between things. Practical commensurability overlooks the complexity of the world; the 
market’s simplification of people and goods by comparing them solely by means of money, demand, or 
utility ignores the necessary differentiation that exists between people and between things. Similarly, 
attempts to simplify or generalize the exchange process itself by mandating the equalization of goods or 
the equality of participants may not be accurate or even desirable. Distinguishing between strict 
commensurability and practical commensurability allows these observations to be made. 
Aristotle recognized the tension between differentiation drawing people towards association for 
exchange and the need to resolve differences through commensurability. A strict commensurability 
versus a practical commensurability distinction allows him to do this. Aristotle’s frustration in Politics 
with chrematistike (the production and trading of goods solely for money) and his approval of oikonomia 
(the production and trading of goods for commodities and their uses) is rooted in the strict versus 
practical distinction (Meikle, 1979, pp. 61-64). Individuals engaged in chrematistike lacked a proper 
appreciation for the implications of strict commensurability, and rather than seeking goods that were 
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useful and unique, instead traded solely in order to produce monetary profit. For any individual seeking 
to exchange, it is through the practical sense of commensurability that they make their goods equal and 
comparable and this is most often done with money. Money, however, is not inherently useful while 
exchangeable goods are useful. A good’s usefulness and realized value is in relation to its purposes. Any 
individual engaged in chrematistike has obscured this realization; it is the differences and uniqueness of 
goods that gives them value. Their value may have a market price associated with it, but its realized, 
actual value is in its use not its price. Without an understanding that goods are only practically 
commensurable but are not strictly commensurable, the chrematistike versus oikonomia distinction is 
ultimately lost. Preserving the differentiation of goods when describing their value means adopting the 
strict sense of commensurability; generalizations about the equality of goods means losing important 
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